That sense has deepened over the last couple of years with the Abraham Accords normalising relations between Israel and important Gulf Arab states and the continued rise in the Israeli economy and living conditions.
Israeli leaders also saw Hamas break from its Gazan confines by using its escalation with Israel to attempt to negotiate concessions on Jerusalem, not solely the lifting of the blockade on Gaza, as it had done in the past.
In so doing, Hamas appeared to be usurping leadership of the Palestinian national movement from President Abbas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority. While the , , and wars were all focused on Gaza, the new round of fighting, including in Gaza, has reaffirmed the centrality of Jerusalem in the conflict.
The evolving situation in East Jerusalem — at the Holy Esplanade and in neighbourhoods such as Sheikh Jarrah — has come to epitomise the fundamental elements underlying the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the experiences of Palestinians living through it.
With growing frequency, Palestinians in these protests raised calls for Hamas, a self-described Islamic national liberation and resistance movement, to step in and do something, clearly positioning the movement in Palestinian eyes as a bulwark against Israeli aggression in contrast with Fatah in the West Bank. At these same protests, Palestinians hurled insults at Abbas and the PA for their ineffectiveness at defending Jerusalem, particularly after they had used the city as the pretence for cancelling Palestinian legislative elections.
Indeed, throughout the events that have transpired over the past month, the PA has been consistently mocked. In turn, the PA and Fatah have been relatively silent about these developments, while also cracking down on protests in the West Bank that have erupted in solidarity with Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The novelty this time around, which will inevitably carry longer-term ramifications, was the popular agitation of Palestinians throughout Israel-Palestine, as if boundaries — and particularly the Green Line, marking the armistice line after the war and today separating Israel from the West Bank — had vanished.
The mobilisation occurred despite decades of Israeli attempts at territorial cantonisation that had in effect cut off East Jerusalem from its West Bank hinterland, of which it is an intrinsic part, in the two and a half decades since the signing of the Oslo accords, and separated Palestinian citizens of Israel from Palestinians in the occupied territories since The widespread nature of the fighting and unrest means that a single ceasefire is not going to restore calm, even if it may take the edge off the worst of the violence.
In the wake of the 23 March Israeli elections, from which a new coalition government has yet to emerge, Israeli politicians are taking hawkish stances. There is currently no end date for the operation.
Others criticise the government for its lack of strategy regarding Gaza since Israel pulled soldiers and Jewish settlers out of the strip in The state is evading other options. It is not even discussing other strategies.
Israeli commentators and military analysts have started assembling a victory narrative, talking about how heavy a hit Hamas has taken, giving the appearance that the war may wind down within a matter of days. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, Bennett has called off efforts to form an alternative coalition with Lapid, saying he will go back to negotiating with Netanyahu to form a government.
Alternatively, Israel would go to yet another election. In either case, Netanyahu would succeed, for now, in his effort to stay in power. Hamas has issued a list of demands, all of which, unlike in past escalations, have centred on Jerusalem. It has made clear that it will not consider a ceasefire until Israel ceases its expulsions in Sheikh Jarrah, and evacuates its forces from Al-Aqsa mosque, allowing for freedom of access to and worship at the mosque.
Beyond these two central demands, Hamas has also called for the release of all prisoners detained in these recent events and Israeli acquiescence to Palestinian legislative elections including in East Jerusalem. Hamas is unlikely to see its demands regarding Jerusalem fulfilled — no Israeli government can afford to make concessions in that respect. In Gaza, the Islamist movement will have to consider how much destruction it can allow, given that the task of rebuilding will fall on its shoulders.
Its endgame remains unclear. The PA has been largely silent, offering little more than soundbites condemning Israeli violence against Palestinians in Jerusalem and Gaza. Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh criticised the UN Security Council for failing to produce a joint statement on the situation in a 13 May tweet — but PA officials have said little else of note.
The recent events in Shaikh Jarrah, in which Israel applies its domestic legislation to Palestinian territory in defiance of international law to further this project, has been repeated dozens of times over the years. Palestinians have consistently fought back with every means at their disposal, only to be overwhelmed again and again. One of the most visible consequences of the Oslo process that started in the mids, and one Israel has actively encouraged, has been Palestinian fragmentation, which goes well beyond the Fatah-Hamas schism.
Put simply: Palestinian Authority PA President Mahmoud Abbas has little to no interest in resuming governance of the Gaza Strip, Hamas seems increasingly content to do nothing else, and the political influence of Palestinian communities in exile in national decision-making has declined to virtual insignificance.
For Palestinian citizens of Israel, Shaikh Jarrah was thus not just something Israel is doing to their compatriots in the occupied territories, but also represents all that is wrong about their own situation in Israel.
This is why they not only came to Jerusalem, but also began demonstrating against Israel and its policies in their own cities and villages. In the occupied territories, both Abbas and Hamas are confronting serious crises of legitimacy, and hoped to address this with new legislative and presidential elections that had been called for May and July of this year, respectively.
With the PA largely AWOL during the recent events, yet working hard behind the scenes to keep a lid on West Bank unrest, Hamas saw an opportunity to demonstrate that it aspires to more than perpetuating its provincial government.
For the first time since it seized power in the Gaza Strip in , it has confronted Israel over issues that originated outside the territory. For his part Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu severely miscalculated by failing to recognize that while the Palestinians are down they are not yet out. It decreases the likelihood that Saudi Arabia will join the Abraham Accords, which seemed increasingly unlikely. It helps prevent an Israeli-Turkish rapprochement that was fitfully in the works before the current round of fighting started.
It occludes Russian-linked violence elsewhere, especially in Syria. And it gives Russia the opportunity to burnish its somewhat tarnished image as a responsible great power by joining the European Union, United States, and United Nations in helping mediate the conflict. All of these good things happen without Moscow having to make any serious policy sacrifices.
The advice to Putin would be simple. Provide responsible diplomatic cover for the hardest of the rejectionist states, like Iran. Keep this issue in the spotlight, urge high-profile negotiations, and absolutely batter the US with it, even if it irritates Netanyahu.
The crisis in Gaza has been a nightmare, and it would be crass to think of it as anything but. At the same time, viewed through a dispassionate geopolitical angle, Chinese leaders would not be wrong to see it as an opportunity in their ongoing rivalry with the United States.
The contrast between China working to help coordinate a UN resolution while the United States blocked UNSC public meetings and statements condemning the violence was an easy public relations win for Beijing.
This is not to suggest that China was only playing politics. Beijing has always self-identified as a developing country and has used cooperation with the developing world in international organizations to garner support; there are a lot of UN votes in the global south.
Under Mao Zedong, China described itself as a leader of the third world and support for Palestine was always explicit—after all, Israel was the last Middle Eastern country to formalize diplomatic relations with China in Rhetorical support for Palestine is consistent with Chinese foreign policy values and practice, but it also serves more practical purposes.
It helps build legitimacy among other Arab countries, for one thing, and helps China distinguish itself from the United States, which consistently undermines its own rhetoric on values and human rights with its unconditional support for Israel.
With incidents along the Lebanese border with Israel increasing in the past few days rockets, drones, rioters trying to cross, etc. While it is unlikely that this time around Hezbollah will escalate—as it is aware of its inferior military capabilities—and despite Hezbollah claiming it had no role in this conflict, it is also extremely unlikely it was unaware of the existence of plans to launch rockets from Lebanon towards Israel.
Although the usual tit-for-tat between Hezbollah and Israel has not escalated way beyond that in years, any escalation of tensions and its effects on Lebanon—already on the brink with its own multilayered crisis—would be disastrous. Israel, along with the lifesaving Iron Dome, should avoid, if possible, responding disproportionately to any provocations by Hezbollah if they come , but especially against Lebanese civilians caught in the line of fire who are now basically hostage to the Iran-backed militia.
Gaza was suffering a deficit of over 60 percent of its energy needs before the recent conflict. Various projects and initiatives have been under way with political and financial support from the international community to finally address this deficit and to enable Gaza to embark on a track for sustainable economic growth.
The recent conflict has set Gaza back. At low points, the energy supply represented 15 percent of demand. It all demonstrated the acute challenges Gaza faces in terms of energy security and diversification of supply sources. As Gaza emerges from the wreckage and the international community looks to support efforts to rebuild, it is important to learn from previous lessons and support politically viable projects that that are cost-efficient and sustainable.
Projects such as Gas for Gaza will naturally form the backbone of longer-term sustainable solutions providing Gaza with the ability to generate electricity on a scale not seen before, while contributing to significant carbon emission reduction. The move from diesel-based generation to natural gas alone will reduce the entire emissions for the whole Palestinian territory by nearly 10 percent. High-voltage electricity connections from Israel and Egypt will be necessary to contribute to the energy security mix.
This will need to be augmented by swaths of renewable energy projects throughout Gaza. Coupled with battery storage solutions, such renewable energy projects will help cope with electricity grid intermittency challenges. While these steps will alleviate the hardship of the Gazan people and provide a key enabler for other sectors such as water, there will be regional beneficiaries as well, specifically Israel and Egypt.
Adequate energy supply will help prevent Gaza from disintegrating even further and place her on a trajectory of solid economic growth. With the failed states bordering Egypt and Israel and with the unrest within Israel demonstrated in the recent conflict, can these countries afford for their Gazan neighbors to be without electricity and water? By Shalom Lipner. While the intensity of the fighting appears to have caught some veteran practitioners of Middle East conflict and diplomacy by surprise, a trail of discernable factors led to this fraught outcome.
Fast Thinking May 12, By Atlantic Council. Is an all-out war brewing? What role will regional and global powers now play in the confrontation? From Washington to Jerusalem, our experts are here to weigh in. Inflection Points May 9, By Frederick Kempe.
A year-old issue. The creation of Israel and the 'Catastrophe'. The map today. What is Hamas? What's happening now?
Palestinians celebrate the ceasefire in Gaza City. What are the main problems? What does the future hold? Related Topics. Published 21 May. Published 19 May. Published 1 July. Published 7 December Published 18 November Published 14 May Published 15 May Israel profile.
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